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In the late 1980s and early 1990s a number of factors and events coalesced to
encourage the international community to re-examine high seas fisheries issues
The need to enhance the effectiveness of regional fisheries organizations led to
the development of the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, dealing
with straddling and highly migratory stocks. Both Canada and Australia played a
significant role in the development of this agreement While having much in
common, each state had different interests and concerns Canada's attention
was focused on the problem of straddling stocks, while Australia 's interests have
been primarily, though not exclusively, directed at highly migratory species. This
paper analyses Australian and Canadian practices in relation to regional fishenes
organizations, with a particular emphasis on the United Nations Fish Stocks
Agreement.
A la fin des annees 1980 et au debut des anndes 1990 bon nombre de facteurs
et d'dv~nements se sont conjugues pour encourager la communauto internationale
& rdexaminer les questions relatives 4 la p~che hauturire Le besoin d'amdlIorer
'efficacit des organisations r6gionales de pche a mend a Ia conclusion, en
1995, de I'Accord de p~che des Nations Unies qui traite des stocks chevauchants
et des stocks grands migrateurs Le Canada et IAustralie ont jou6 un role de
premier plan dans la redaction de cet accord, Mdme s ils ont beaucoup de points
en commun, chaque pays avait des preoccupations et des intdr ts difftrents, Le
Canada s'intdressait tout particuldrement au problome des stocks chevauchants
tandis que les prdoccupations de I'Austrahe portaient surtout, mats non
exclusivement, sur les espdces fortement migratrices. Lauteur analyse les
pratiques australiennes et canadiennes en matidre d'organisations r~gionales
de p~che et s 'intdresse particulidrement h l'Accord de pdche des Nations Unies
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I. Australian and Canadian Positions During the Negotiation of the
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Intrvduction
Since the conclusion of the Uited A"tion. Convention on the Law of the
Seal (L()S Convention) and with it the affirmation of national authorit ,
ox cr marine living resources within the 200-mile zone, international atten-
tion has turned to fish stocks which exist within and beyond 200-mile zones,
"straddling stocks", and fish stocks which because of their migratory cycle
require multi-state management, "highly migratory fish stocks." In the case
of highly migratory species, the LOS Convention directs states to
"co-operate directly or through appropriate international organizations" to
manage the resources.- In the case of straddling stocks, the relevant states
are to "seek, either directly or through appropriate ... organizations, to
agree upon the measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conserva-
I i 0 I)ccmber IS2. 1833 t. N T.S 3. 21 ILM 12i1 (entered into force 16 November 14941
I ON\ ('m'entwn]. sce alti, online: Oceans and Law of the Sea - Division for Ocean Affairs and the
La%% of the Sca - http:. %s w un org, Depts'lo-, index.him> (DOALOS]. Canada became a party to
the LOS ( oncntion 7 November 2003
2 Ibid. a[ art. 14 1
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tion and development of such stocks, 3 The LOS Convention wording
acknowledges the importance of regional fisheries organizations with
responsibility for straddling and highly migratory fish stocks management
and seeks to encourage enhancement of the role of regional fisheries orga-
nizations and, where none exist. the creation of such bodies.
While it can be argued that it was the ineffectiveness of the then-exist-
ing regional fisheries organizations that contributed to the pressure for the
adoption of national 200-mile zones, 4 this perceived ineffectiveness did
not inhibit the LOS Convention negotiators from relying on regional fish-
ery organizations for management of fisheries beyond the national 200-
mile zones. In some respects, 200-mile national fishing zones and the
consequent displacement of distant water fishers was acceptable to the
displaced because of the ineffectiveness of fisheries organizations in
curtailing fishing activities on the high seas. It is for this reason that the
concerns of states such as Canada regarding the implications for national
fisheries within 200 miles of fishing activities beyond 200 miles were not
addressed directly during the LOS Convention negotiations.5
In the late 1980s and early 1990s a number of factors and events
coalesced to force the international community to re-examine high seas
fishing issues. The issue of unregulated high seas fishing attracted signifi-
cant attention as a result of the drifinet fishing controversy in the late 1980s
and 1990s." The lack of specific provisions in the LOS Convention for the
conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory stocks
led to an increasing number of disputes between coastal states and high
seas fishing states over what the coastal states considered to be excessive
3. Ibid. at art. 64011.
4. See generall). Mi. Peterson "international Fisheries Management" in Peter M. Haas, Robert
0. Keohane & Marc A Levy. eds.. Institutions. for the Earth. Source% of Elh-cthe International
Environmental Protection (Cambridge, Mas.: MIT Press. 1993) 249.
5. See Robert Hage. "Canada and the Law of the Sea" (January 1984) 8(1) Marine Policy 2 at 10
and Ted L. McDorman, "Will Canada Ratify the Law of the Sea Convention?" (1988) 25 San Diego
L. Rev. 535 at 555-57. More generally on the fisheries provisions of the LOS Com'ention and their
shortcomings, see S.P. Balasubramamnan. "Fishery provisions of the ICNT: Part 1" (October 198 1)
5(41 Marine Policy 313: S.F Balasubramanian, "Fishery Provisions of the ICNT: Part 2" (January
1982) 640 Marine Policy 27; Shigeru Oda. "Fisheries Under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea" (1983) 77 Am. J. Int'l L. 739; Parzival Copes, "The Impact of UNCLOS III on
Management of the World's Fisheries" (July 1981)5(3) Marine Policy217; WilliamT. Burke,"Highly
Migratory Species in the New Law of the Sea" (1984) 14 Ocean Devel. & Int'l L. 273; and Carlos
Dominguez Diaz, "Towards a New Regune for High Seas Fisheries" (1994 ) 7 HagueY.B. Int'l L 25.
6. See Douglas M. Johnston, "The Driftnetting Problem in the Pacific Ocean: Legal Consider-
ations and Diplomatic Options" (1990) 21 Ocean Devel. & Int'l L. 5 and William T, Burke, Mark
Freeberg & Edward L. Miles, "United Nations Resolutions on Driftnet Fishing: An Unsuitable Pre-
cedent for High Seas and Coastal Fisheries Management" (1994) 25 Ocean Devel. & Int'l L. 127.
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fishing in areas adjacent to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)., This in
turn led to increasing calls for the extension of coastal state jurisdiction
beyond the 200-mile zone and unilateral action on the part of coastal states.'
The problem of controlling foreign fishing outside 200 miles pre-occupied
Canada since many of the most lucrative stocks fished by Eastern Canadi-
ans occur both within and beyond the 200-mile zone. Foreign overfishing
of these stocks was seen as a significant factor in the stock declines that
devastated many Eastern Canadian coastal communities, leaving thousands
of fish harvesters and fish plant workers unemployed.' The need to create
and enhance the effectiveness of regional fisheries organizations led even-
tually to the 1995 UN A greement for the Implementation of the Provisions
q/ the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December
19N2 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migraton , Fish Stocks (Fish Stocks Agreement).10
Both Australia and Canada are parties to this Fish Stocks Agreement
and both played a significant role in the negotiations leading to its conclu-
sion. Moreover, both states have worked assiduously within various
regional fisheries organizations to make the organizations more effective.
While having much in common, Canada's primary and highly-public
interest has been the straddling stocks of the East Coast, while Australia's
primary, though not exclusive, interest has been highly migratory species
such as tuna. Australia's direct economic and political interests in high
seas fisheries are not on par with Canada's. Nevertheless, whilst a minor
player, Australia has played a constructive brokerage role in international
7, For a comprehensive overview of the various situations, see Evelyne Meltzer, "Global Over-
view of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: The Nonsustainable Nature of High Seas
Fisheries" (1994) 25 Ocean Devel. & Int'l L. 255. A useful summary of the early stages of a number
of these disputes is found in Edward L. Miles & William T. Burke, "Pressures on the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts: The Problem of
Straddling Stocks" (1989) 20 Ocean Devel. & Int'l L, 344, See also. Barbara Kwiatkowska, "The
High Seas Fisheries Regime: At A Point of No Return" (1993) 8 Int'l I Mar. & Coast. L. 331. B.
Applebaum, "The Straddling Stocks Problem: The Northwest Atlantic Situation, International Law
and Options for Coastal State Action" in Alfred H.A. Soons. ed.. Implementation of the Law of the
Sva Convention Through International Institurion .Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Conference of
the Law of the Sea Institute Held June 12-15. 19,8 (Honolulu: The Law of the Sea Institute. 1990)
and Karl M. Sullivan. "Conflict in the Management of a Northwest Atlantic Transboundary Cod
Stock" (1989) 13 Marine Policy 118.
K See Barbara Kwiatkowska, "Creeping Jurisdiction Beyond 200 Miles in the Light of the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention and State Practice" (1991) 22 Ocean Devel. & Int'l L. 153.
9, Sullivan, infro note 67 at 212-16 and Anthony T. Charles, "The Atlantic Canadian Groundfishery:
Roots of a Collapse" (1995) 18 Dal. L. J. 65.
10. 4 December 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542 (1995) (entered into force II December 2001), online:
DOALOS, supra note I [Fish Stocks Agreement].
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fisheries diplomacy, a role that has been reinforced by Australia's strong
commitment to regional and bilateral fisheries arrangements. What
follows is an analysis of the Australian and Canadian practices as regards
regional fisheries organizations and the Fish Stocks Agreement.
I. Australian and Canadian Positions During the Negotiation of the Fish
Stockv Agreement
Australia undertook to play a key role in the negotiations of the Fish Stocks
Agreement adopting a "moderate coastal state" position' committed to
practical solutions to the problems of straddling stocks and highly migra-
tory species.' 2 These solutions included an elaboration of flag state
responsibilities and urging flag states to ensure that their vessels comply
with conservation and management measures adopted by regional fisher-
ies organizations. I-I
The Australian delegation also worked closely with representatives from
Pacific island states, as a fellow member of the South Pacific Forum, 4 and
helped to ensure a continuing focus on the issues related to highly migra-
tory stocks. While Australia has interests in straddling demersal stocks in
the Tasman Sea and Indian Ocean, tuna fishing in the West-Central
Pacific, and in the Patagonian toothfish fishery in sub-Antarctic waters,
Australia's only significant international fishery over the long-term has
been that for southern bluefin tuna. It is this fishery which was the major
influence on Australia's international fisheries posture. Although it is
arguable that the main driver of the conference was the Canadian issue of
straddling stocks, Australia had a major role in ensuring that the problems
11, Anthony Bergin & Marcus Haward. -Australia's Approach to High Seas Fishing" (1994) 10
Int'l I Mar. & Coast. L. 362.
12. -Comments on Issues before the Conference submitted by the Delegation of Australia (A/
Conf. 1641L.9, I July 1993)," reprinted in Jean-Pierre Levy & G.G, Schram, United Natirn. Confer-
ence on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly .Migra:or, Fish Stock%, Selected Documents (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1996j at 139.
13. Bergin & Haward supra note I I at 364.
14. The key role of Australian delegate Mary Harwood was recognized in "Statement of the Chair-
man, Ambassador Satya N. Nandan, on 4 August 1995, upon the Adoption of the Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks (AICONE 164/35, 20 September 1995),' reprinted in Levy & Schram, supra
note 12 at 749. The South Pacific Forum, now the Pacific Islands Forum, %as established in 197 I It
represents Heads of Government of 14 Pacific Island states and Australia and New Zealand. The
forum aims to facilitate political and economic cooperation amongst members See, online: Pacific
Island Forum Secretariat <http://www.foumsec.org.fj>.
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of highly migratory stocks were adequately addressed.
Canada invested heavily in the Fish Stockv Agreement negotiations.
In the late 1980s, Canada, together with Chile, Argentina, and a number of
other coastal states resolved to bring the issues of high seas fishing to the
table at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) held at Rio in June 1992."- They succeeded in having the issue
placed on the agenda of UNCED,'6 and thus began a flurry of activity.7 In
1990 Canada hosted a Conference on the Conservation and Management
of High Seas Fisheries in St. Johns, Newfoundland, " which was followed
by a meeting of experts convened by the United Nations in Santiago, Chile,
in May 1991. The Santiago Text which emerged from the latter meeting
set out three principles: the special interest of coastal states in straddling
and highly migratory fish stocks; the need for consistency between high
seas and EEZ measures adopted in respect of these stocks; and the require-
ment of no adverse impact on EEZ stocks by high seas fishing.'" The
Santiago meeting was followed in July 1991 by a meeting of Technical
Experts on High Seas Fisheries organized under the auspices of the UN
Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea (UNDOALOS) which
produced a set of Guidelines.2" At the third UNCED PrepCom meeting in
August-September 1991 a revised Santiago Text was presented by a group
composed of Canada and twelve other coastal states. It called for the
15. See Paul Fautcux "The Canadian Legal Initiative on High Seas Fishing" (1993) 4 Y.B. Int'l
Env. L. 51 for an account of Canadas actions. stratcgy and proposals. See also, Kwiatkowska,
supra note 7 at 345-53 for an account of the "leveraged diplomacy" behind the UNCED results,
16. See UN GAOR, 22 December 1989, 85th Plen. Mtg., UN Doc A:RES,44'228.
17. The background leading up to the Conference is %%ell canvassed in the literature. See
' g., Jose A. Ytturiaga, The International Regime of Fisheries From UNCLOS 1982 to the Presential
Sea (The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1997) at 179-201, D. Freestone, "The Effective Conservation and
Management of High Seas Living Resources: Towards a New Regime?" 11994) Canterbury Law
Reviews 357; Donald Grzybo% ski et al, "A Historical Perspectise Leading Up to and Including the
United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks" (1995)
131) Pace Envtl. L. Rev, 49, Fauteux, supra note 15; Montaki Hayashi, "United Nations Confer-
ence on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: An Analysis of the 1993 Session"
(1994) II Ocean Yearbook 26, and Howard L. Brown, "The United Nations Conference on Strad-
dling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks An Analysis of International Environmental
Law and the (onterence¢ Final Act" (1996) 21 Vt. L. Rev. 547.
18. See Fauteux..supra note 15 at 62-63. See also D. Momtaz, "La juridictton larv6e des Etats
c6tierN sur les stocks de poissons chevauchants et grands migratuers situs au-dia de leurs zones
economiques" in Najeeb AI-Nauimi & Richard Meese, eds., International Legal Issues Arising Un-
der the wt'd Na.l, ifm Drcade of International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) at 549.
19. Developed by Canada, Chile and New Zealand. See Fauteux, supra note 15 at 63,
20. Reproduced as an Annex to Kwiatkowska, supra note 8 at 354-55. The full product of the
Consultation can be found in UNDOALOS, The Law qf the Sea. The Regime for High Seas Fisher-
iv',s" Status and Phisects.v, (New York: United Nations, 1992).
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development of new principles to respond to the problems of overfishing,
drifinetting. reflagging, and lack of survcillance, control and enforcement
respecting high seas fishing.' The text Nas opposed by distant water fish-
ing states, in particular by the European Union, and no agreement was
reached on its inclusion in the draft of Agenda 21. The proposal was rein-
troduced in the fourth UNCED PrepCom meeting in March 1992 with the
support of an additional twenty -seven developing states2- where it was
opposed once again. Ultimately. Canada agreed to a compromise whereby
UNCED was asked to agree to convene an intergovernmental conference
to examine the issues in detail. -- This agreement wvas embodied in Para-
graph 17.49(e) of.4,genu 21.24 In September 1992 the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization (FAO convened a Technical Consultation on High Seas
Fisheries to prepare an information package as a precursor to the forth-
coming UN conference.25 By Resolution 47;192 of 22 December 1992,
the United Nations General Assembly called for the establishment of the
United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migra-
tory Fish Stocks. The Conference met in six negotiating sessions between
1993 and 1995 and on 4 August 1 q95 adopted. %%ithout a vote, the text of
the Fish Stocks .4gmement.-" Two resolutions were also adopted by the
Conference. The first called for provisional application of the Agreement
pending its entry into force. The second called for continuing review of
developments relating to straddling and highly migratory fish stocks by
the Secretary-General and the General Assembly.2'
Throughout the negotiations Canada promoted coastal state. and thus
its own, interests. The seriousness with which Canada viewed the issue of
overfishing in high seas waters adjacent to it,, national w aters was made
manifest on 9 March 1995 when Canada arrested the Spanish fishing
vessel Estai while it was operating outside the Canadian 200-mile zone
and thus precipitated the highly-publicized diplomatic crisis with the
21, LNDoc.ACO\F15I PC\GI!L.16.
22, LN Doc. A (ONE 151/PC \G.il LIt Re%,I, 16 March 1992.
23 Fauteux, supra note 15 at 65-W6.
24 Report ofthe UnMted \'ampn% (u mtkrvnae tin Emn'virurnt and IDechyinsent, UN GCA( )R. 47th
Ses.. AnneN 1, U.N. Doc, A CONFISI 26 tvol. 11) 1 9Y2)
25. See "Report of the Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing and the Papers Presented at
the Technical C(un'ultation on High Sca~s Fishing (A/CON F 64 'INF/2, 14 May 1993 )". reprinted in
Levy & Schram, supra note 12 at 273.
26, Supra note 10.
27. "Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly \1 ,ruiory
Fish Stocks tACONE.164,38, 7 September 1995)". reprinted in Levy & Svhram, supra note 12 at
801 (see, in particular, Annex at 809 ,
54 The Dalhousie Law Journal
European Union. "
A fundamental tenet of Canada's position was that the Conference
should produce a legally binding document rather than mere recommen-
dations.2' The three elements that Canada considered essential for inclu-
sion in such an agreement were:
" a set of rules to ensure that management measures outside 200
miles were compatible with reasonable, scientifically based man-
agement measures inside 200 miles for the same stocks;
" a global enforcement regime, under which vessels that violate re-
gional conservation rules could be arrested and turned over to their
flag state authorities for prosecution; and
* a global system of compulsory and binding dispute settlement."
These elements, some of which proved highly controversial, were
contained in the draft convention that Canada presented to the Confer-
ence, co-sponsored with Argentina, Chile, Iceland and New Zealand, on
28 July 1993.1
In the end, Canada largely succeeded in having its objectives met
through the Conference.3 2 This success is clear from the Government's
statements upon the Fish Stocks Agreement's adoption, which it described
as **an important Canadian accomplishment that will provide much of what
29 For discussion of the Canada/EU dispute and its resolution, see Peter Davies, "The EC/Cana-
dian Fisheries Dispute in the Northwest Atlantic" (1995)44 LCL.Q. 927. See also Sullivan, supra
note 7; Phillip Saunders, "And Now That The War is Over... Looking Back at the Canada-European
Union Fisheries Confrontation of 1995" (1996) 31 Canadian Law Newsletter I5; and Christopher C.
Joyner & Alejandro A. von Gustedt, "The Turbot War of 1995: Lessons for the Law of the Sea"
(1996 11I Int'l J. Mar. & Coast. L. 425
29. "Letter Dated 28 May 1993 from the Chairman of the Delegation of Canada to the Conference
Addressed to the Chairman of the Conference" UN Doc A CONE164 L.5, 28 May 1993, reprinted
in Levy and Schram, note 13 at 121,
30. "Second Substantive Session of the United Nations Conference on Straddling and Highly Mi-
gratory Fish Stocks, New York 14-31 March: Revises and Consolidated Negotiating Test" UN Press
Release SEA/] 442 March 1994.
3 1, "Draft Convention on the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks on the
High Sca% and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks on the High Seas" UN Doc. AICONF.164/L. I/Rev.1,
28 July 1993, reprinted in Levy & Schram, supra note 12 at 163.
32. For a full discussion of the provisions of the Fish Stocks Agreement, see Lawrence Juda, "The
1995 United Nations Agrcement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: A
Cntique" ( 1997) 2x Ocean Dcvcl. & Int'l L. 147 and Andri Tahmdro, "Conservation and Manage-
ment of Transboundary Fish Stocks: Comments in Light of the Adoption of the 1995 Agreement for
the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks"
(1997) 2X Ocean Devel. & Int'l L. I.
Australia and Canada in Regional Fisheries Organizations: 55
Implementing the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement
Canada has sought, tor more than 20 years, to protect these stocks in our
seas. "
' 3
In respect of the first Canadian objective, an objective shared equally
by Australia, the Fish Stocks Agi-vvment embodies the concept of compat-
ibilitv of conservation measures throughout a stock's migratory range and
mandates the application of the precautionary approach and ecosystem
management. 4 It institutionalizes the duty on states to cooperate in the
conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks
through regional fisheries organizations. " The Fish Sticks Agreement
operationalizes the duty to cooperate by laying certain ground rules for the
activities to be agreed upon and undertaken by and within regional fisher-
ies organizations. They include rules regarding the acquisition, dissemina-
tion and evaluation of scientific data and participation of new members. "
The Agreement also calls upon non-members to refrain from fishing in
contravention of conservation and management measures adopted by
regional fisheries organizations. "
Canada's second objective, again an objective also sought by Austra-
lia, is. in part, met through the provisions of the Fish Stocks Agreement
which set out in detail the duties incumbent on flag states for vessel and
crev licensing, monitoring, control and surveillance and enforcement3
Perhaps of greater importance. however, are the provisions providing for
port state control and non-flag state enforcement which are designed to
provide for enforcement if flag states are either unwilling or unable to
exercise control over their vessels."' In particular, Articles 20 and 21
provide for an international cooperative scheme for enforcement of
regional and subregional conservation and management measures at the
subregional, regional and global levels. It includes provision for non-flag
state boarding and inspection by members of regional fisheries organiza-
tions within the relevant regulatory area to ensure compliance with that
organization's conservation and management measures.4 0 Australian
33. Canada's Foreign Fisheries Relations Policy, Department of Fisheries and Oceans websitc.
<http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.caicommunic fish_manftiri'ish b64.sldOiO.htm>.
34 See Fish Stocks Agreement.supr note !0at arts 5-7 and the following section entitled "Adop-
tion of the Precautionary and Ecosystem Approach".
35, lbid at arts. 8-9. See also the section below entitled "Issues Respecting Regional Fisheries
Organizations."
36. Ibid. at arts. 10-16.
37. Ibid. at arts. 17& 33.
38. Ibid. at arts. 18& 19,
39. Ibid. at arts. 20-23.
40. See the section below entitled "Enforcement at Sea".
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elliwrts to promote stronger centralized compliance systems for regional
fisheries regimes found expression in provisions in the Fsh Stocks Agree-
ment that allow members of a regional fisheries organization to deter
vessels that have engaged in activities that undermine the effectiveness of
the organization,, conservation and management measures' and in the
adoption of port state controls respecting foreign fishing vessels. -
The third Canadian objective, once again an equally important
objective for Australia, of attaining a compulsory dispute settlement
mechanism, is met through the incorporation of the dispute settlement
procedures of the LOS Convention into the Fish Stocks Agrvement and
otherwise pro% ide for settlement of technical disputes and dispute preven-
tion and a% oidance.
43
While Australia and Canada had different perspectives regarding the
negotiation of the Fish Stiocks .4greement, they vere working towards the
same goals: a completed treaty text which enhanced the authority and
etfectiveness of regional fisheries organizations in dealing with straddling
and highly migratory fish stocks and which placed greater responsibilities
on states to control fishing activities on the high seas.
II. Ratification and Legislative Implementation o the Fish Stocks .greement
1. Australia
Australia ratified the Fish Stocks Agreement on 23 December 1999. In
Australia the exploitation of highly migratory and straddling fish stocks
produces o\ er AUD 260 million in fish sales and employs more that 3000
people.' The report on the Fish Stocks.4greement by the Commonwealth
41 Fish Stl(# A. *bre'ment, supra note 10 at art. 20(7). Use of the provision might entail such
measure, as the essel blacklist maintained by the Forum Fisheries Agency in the \\estern and Cen-
tral Pacific (.can. Respecting the mandate and work of the Forum Fisheries Agency, see text ac-
companying note I 13.
42 ied at art, 23. U se of this provision is en\ isioned a% entailing inspections of documents. gear
and catch and prohibitions on catch landing,, and transshipments. Both Australia and Canada have
used its port state powsers to prohibit provisioning of foreign fishing wessels.
43 ibid at arts 27-32. See also Ted L Mc) orman, "The Dispute Settlement Regime of the Strad-
dling and Highly Migratory Fish Stock, Convention " 419971 35 Can. Y.B. Int'l Law 25 and Peter
Orchcuh. KetilI Siggurjonmisn & Ted L. \kDorman. "The 1995 United Nations Straddling and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement: Management, Enforcement and Dispute Settlement" (1998)
13 Int'l I Mar. & Coast I.. 119,
44. Joint standing Committee on Treaties - Fis Sto'wks, Igirvt~net. Report 28 - 14 Treaties Tabled
on 12 o tber 19141) (3 December I 911Y) at 2 24, online: Parliament of Australia-Parlinfo Web <http:/
iparlinfosscb.aph go\ au/piweb/search mam.aspx'?> [Joint Standing Committee on Treaties].
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Parliament's Joint Standing 'ommittee on Treaties noted that the costs
associated with implementing the Agreement were estimated at AUD 3,5
to ALID 5 million per annum." The Committee's Report encouraged
government agencies to ensure the full participation of fishing industry
representatives in decision-making, particularly where decisions related
to the financial impacts of implementation and it endorsed the creation of
a *'remote area fisheries consultative group"' " to facilitate exchanges
between government and industry. The Report concluded that Australia
was, in fact, already pursing most of the objectives of the Fish Sodk,..Igrve-
ment, both legislatively and administrativelI., 4' and recommended that rati-
fication be undertaken."'
Also preceding ratification \was the enactment of the Fisheries Legis-
lationAmendmentAct .\o. 1) 1999 (Cth. )4 on 3 November 1999 to which
the Fish Stocks Agreement is a schedule. Further regulations w\ill need to
be passed regarding license conditions as well as the authorization of
Australian vessels to fish for straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.s"
The Fisherie.% LegislationAmendmentAct (No. 1) 1999 (Cth.) provides
for new measures for monitoring, control and surveillance of both domes-
tic and foreign fishing operations. It clarifies the rules for the use of force
to enable boarding of vessels -' and pursuit of vessels.5- The legislation
mandates automatic vessel forfeiture for offenders and thus closes a loop-
hole that had resulted in seized vessels escaping forfeiture or penalties. -"
The Fisheries Lteislation Amendment .-Ict 1999 (Cth.) also contains a
number of provisions that became effective when the Fish Stocks Agree-
ment entered into legal force and thus has enabled Australia to assert its
rights and obligations as a party to the Fish Stocks Agreoement.54 Australia
45 Ibid
4h Ibid. at art. 2.27
47 Ibid. at art. 2 42
4N Ibid. at art. 2.44.
49. (Cth.I. online: Australian Government - Attorney General's Department: ScalePlus Law Re-
source <http://scaleplus.law.govau-. The Fisheries Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (Cth.) is also
discussed in the Marcus Haward, et at chapter in this volume.
50. Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. supra note 44 at 2.35
51. Fisheries Legislation .- 1mndment Act 1999, supra note 49. s. 2.
52. Ibid. at s. 17.
53. Ibid at Part 5. Section 26 notes that seizure, detention or forfeiture of a boat has effect despite
use of the Admiralt. ct 1988 (Cth.) being used to arrest the boat, making an order for its sale, or the
boat being sold.
54. These issues were elaborated in a discussion paper prepared by the Australian Fisheries Man-
agement Authority in November 2001. See AFMA Discussion Paper "Implementation of the United
Nations Fish Stocks Agreement" (AFMA. Canberra: 2001 ). online: AFM A <http//www.afna.gov.au/
licensing%20and%2oentitlementsldicussion%2opaper.php,
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has used the provisions of this legislation to prohibit entry to the port of
Fremantlc to two vessels suspected of unregulated fishing for Patagonian
toothfish. -- The 1999 Act also strengthens the ability of the Australian
go\ernment to take action against Australian flagged vessel' on the high
seas and Australian nationals operating foreign flagged vessels.5"
On December 23, 1998. .4ustnlia v Oceans Policp57(AOP) was released.
AOP is based on ecologically sustainable development and integrated
management of Australian oceans. It embodies commitments to ecosys-
tern-based management and is to be implemented through a series of
regional marine plans (RMPs) around Australia. The first RMP is being
developed for the south-east region, including waters off the states of South
Australia. Victoria, New South Wales and Tasmania. The South East
region includes the South Tasman Rise" and sub-Antarctic Macquarie Is-
land. In addition to establishing an institutional framework of regional
marine planning,-" AOP includes some 390 initiatives or responses,
including a number related to the interest and obligations of Australia's
international fisheries.' Australia's obligations under the LOS Convention
were cited as a major impetus for the development of the AOP"
2. ('anala
Canada ratified the Fi.s Stocks Agreenmctt on 3 August 1999. As a long-
time proponent of the need for more effective arrangements to deal with
the overfishing of east coast straddling stocks of importance to Canada
such as cod, flounder, redfish and turbot, it is not surprising that Canada
NN as an early ratifier of the Fish Snvk. Agreement. The necessary legisla-
tion for implementation of the Fish Stocks Agreement was adopted on 20
April 11999. It resulted in amendments to the Ciou.Ntad Fisheries Protec-
56 Fisheric Leviuatuifn Amendment li 1999. wuprd note 4Q.m .s4 & s7(
57. AustL Commonwealth, -lUd1ini .a Ot ca v Poicy lip/ I. Caring U nderstanding g gi!sn i ll' vi/
i( 'anberra: Environment Australia. 11,198) [Autrz uia' (h cam Polict" \i. 11.
58 Sec discussion of mssucs related to fishing off the South Tasman Rise in the section below
entitled "Enforcement at Sea."
59 Sce Sakell i a. chapter in this volume We also. 1Atraia () cm% Policy ibI . supr note 57.
60 '\ustl.. Commonwealth..4ustraliia% 0 cun. NbcIvd lid 2 Spelk14 Sectifind ei trow. (Canberra,
invironment Australia, 199811 at s, 22 -I 1,
61 .4ustralia '" Ocvcw'. l)dMiy 1W 1, supra note 57 at 7 & Appendix 1: "Policy Guidance for
( cans Planning and Management" (37-40).
62 Bill (-27, In .l i amend the Coastal IFi.ehirihs Prutection Act and the Canada Shipping Act,
Ist Scss. 36th Parl, 1999 (assented to 17 June 1999).
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tion.A id' and the Canada Shipping.Act."' At the time of ratification, Lloyd
Axworthy (then Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)
proclaimed that the Fish Stocks Agreement "represents a major step
toward international cooperation in conserving and managing fisheries
resources on the high seas" and that Canada would make promotion of its
ratification and implementation a national priority."'
The principal Canadian legislation dealing with foreign fishing activ-
ity in Canadian waters, the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, was amended
in 1994 to empower the government to act beyond 200 nautical miles to
enforce conservation measures adopted by the Northwest Atlantic Fisher-
ies Organization (NAFO)"" in certain situations and against vessels of
certain states?' The 1999 amendments refer explicitly to the Fish Stocks
Agreement and provide the authority to act, by regulation, to implement
the Fish StocksAgreement and any other fisheries treaties or arrangements
which might be concluded."
The 1999 amendments focus on enhanced enforcement rather than on
management principles. The Coastal Fisheries Protection Act and regula-
tions enacted pursuant thereto make it an offence under Canadian law for
all Canadian, foreign and stateless vessels to fish or transship in Canadian
waters or the NAFO regulatory area in contravention of regulatory
measures adopted by NAFO."9 The legislation retains provisions allowing
fisheries protection officers to board and search any fishing vessel found
in Canadian waters or the NAFO regulatory area7 and clarifies the proce-
dures relating to enforcement action on the high seas directed against
vessels which are believed to have fished illegally in Canadian waters or
the NAFO regulatory area. It includes rules pertaining to arrest,7' use of
63. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-33 (Coastal Fisheries Protection Act).
64. R.SC. 1985, c. S-9.
65. Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, News Release "Canada has
ratified United Nations Fish Agreement" (5 August 1999).
66. NAFO was established by the Con% ention on the Future Multilateral Co-operation in the North-
west Atlantic Fisheries, done in Ottawa, 24 October 1978, reprinted in Official Journal of the Euro-
pean Communities, No. L 378 (1978). See also, for the text of the Treaty and respecting the work of
NAFO. online: Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization <http:/www.nafo.ca>,
67. Canada. Coastal Fisheries Protection Act as Amended in 1994, 33 I.L.M, 1383 (1994). For a
detailed history of the circumstances leading to the enactment of this legislation and the subsequent
disputes over its application, see Michael S. Sullivan, "The Case in International Law for Canada's
Extensions of Fisheries Jurisdiction Beyond 200 Miles" (1997) 28 Ocean Devel. & Int'l L. 203
68. Ibid. atss. 1(4)&3()
69. Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, supra note 63 at s. 5, 16.1 & 16.2.
70. Ibid, at s. 7,
71. Ibid. ats. 8.
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force, 2 seizure" and forfeiture of vessels and catch."4 These provisions
demonstrate Canada's commitment to both implementation and
cooperation.
The Ocens.4ct'l which came into force (with the exception of section
53) on 31 January 1997 contains the fisheries management provisions.
While the Oceans .Act predates Canadian ratification of the Fish Stocks
Agreement, the Oceans Act deals with many of the key management
concepts and principles contained in the 1995 Agreement. Attempts to
assess the extent to which Canada, or any other state, has implemented the
fisheries management provisions of the Fish StocksAgreement are plagued
by the uncertainty created by the relevant provisions of the Agreement.
Part Ill (Articles 5-7) of the Agrvcemnt deals with conservation and
management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and
establishes principles of responsible fisheries management. Article 5
requires that states implement a number of ill-defined principles including
the ecosystem approach, conser~ation of biological diversity, the objec-
tives of "long-term sustainabilitv" and optimum utilization, and the
principle of precaution. Article 5 does not prioritize these objectives and
principles, some of NN hich might be regarded as contradictory. The precau-
tionary approach, however, is given separate treatment in Article 6. Article
60() requires states "to apply the precautionan approach widely to the
conservation and management of straddling fish stocks," while Article 6(2)
requires states "to be more cautious NN hen information is uncertain, reli-
able or inadequate." How\ever. as one commentator has noted:
Once the Narious qualifiers in Articles 5 and 6 and Annex II have been
digeted, it seems clear that states could adopt a wide range of management
approaches and justilf them on the basis of the agreement. The continued
prominence of an objectie of optimum utilization, the use of MSY as a
starting point, the ability to use "relevant .. economic factors" [Art. 5(b)]
to qualify scientific findings on NISY [maximum sustainable yield] - all
of this would be descriptive of a properly managed system under the EEZ
regime in the LOS 1982 .... Second, despite the use of the term
"precaution" as a centrepiece of the Agreement, once the definition of
"reference points" is worked through, precaution begins to look
suspiciously like a properly managed system based on MSY and TACs
72 Md at s. X I.
73 hid at s. 9.
74 hid at s. 14
75. s,C 1996, c. 31.
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[total allowable catchesi, which is what ,Nas supposed to be in place
already."
Despite this uncertainty, or perhaps because of it. Canada claims to have
operationalized the rele ant principles. In a speech delivered in Paris in
December, 2001, Herb DhaliN\al, Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.
referred to the Ocean, Act and its incorporation of the principles of
sustainable development, integrated management, precaution, and ecosys-
tern management and boasted that "most importantly, it [the Occa.act]
puts these principles into practice.-" Howe\ er, in reviewing the Depart-
ment of Fisheries and Oceans annual performance reports from 1998 to
the present, one discovers that while Canada has firmly committed itself
to the adoption of the principles set out in Articles 5 and 6 of the Fish
StockvAgruement, the implementation of these principles is still a %vork in
progress. '
3. Commonalities
Both Australia and Canada proceeded quickly to ratify and implement the
Fish Stocks .4,grgenent into national legislation. This is particularly the
case as regards the "legal" parameters of the Fish Stocks Agrecvwnt
respecting enforcement matters. It can be argued that the provisions of the
Fish Stocks Ag.'mnent respecting fisheries management in national
waters have not been as readily embraced in the national legislation and
policies of Australia and Canada. This is explainable in part because the
meaning of concepts such as eco-ystem management and precaution are
notoriously difficult to translate into legislation and practical management
measures that must take into account the interests of the fish, fishers, local
communities and nation. It is also worth noting that those charged with the
responsibility for fisheries may resist the adoption of the management
wording of the Fish St'k. .-Igrcement because they know that this year's
reconceptualization of fisheries management issues which promises the
long sought nirvana will either be shown to have the same shortcomings
as past approaches, or will soon be replaced by 'new" concepts.
76 Phillip M. Saunders, "Jun,,diction and Principle in the Implementation of the Law of The Sea
The Case of Straddling Stocks" in Chi Carmody. Yuji Iwaa.a & Sylvia Rhodes, eds., Trilateral
Perpectives on International Legal ls.ues. Conflict and C.0ht'rence' I New. York, Transnational Pub-
lishers, 2003).
77. Speaking Notes forThe Honourable Herb Dhaliwal, PC.. \lP, Min itcr of Fisheries and Oceans,
at the Global Conference on Oceans and Coasts at Rio+ ., Paris, France, December 3, 24111, on file
with authors.
78. For a more detailed examination of these issues, see Haward et al. chapter in this volume
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I11. Canada and Australia in Regional Fisheries Organizations
1. Issues Respecting Regional Fisheries Organizations
The future sustainability of straddling stocks, highly migratory species
and certain other species, such as anadromous species (salmon), is in the
hands of regional fisheries organizations." International instruments such
as the Fish Stocks Agreement, the 1993 FAO Agreement to Promote
Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures
by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (the Compliance Agreement)," the
1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries,81 the FAO Interna-
tional Plan ofAction on the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-FC)
and the FAO International Plan of Action on Illegal. Unregulated and
Unreported Fishing (IPOA-IUU)P all include references to the key role of
regional fisheries organizations in the conservation and management of
fish stocks. These new international instruments impose or seek to create
new duties on regional fisheries organizations and their member states with
regard to illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, overcapacity issues,
bycatch and discards, and unreliable catch-related data and other statis-
tics. The goal of all these "new" responsibilities for regional fisheries
organizations is the enhancement of the effectiveness of the organizations
for the sustainability of the fisheries under their mandates.
Despite the increasing centrality of regional fisheries organizations in
the emerging high seas fisheries management regime and the goal of
enhancing their effectiveness which is at the heart of many of the above-
79 (tI L. Lugten, 4 Retiew ol Measures Taken by Regional Marine Fisheries Bodies to Address
Contemporar-. Fishery Isvie% (Rome: FAO Fisheries Circular 940, 1999).
80 33 ILM. 968 (1994), online: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations - Legal
Office <http:l;% w% fao.org/Legalttreaties/treaty-e.htm> (Compliance Agreement], approved by the
FAO Conference at its Twenty-Seventh Session, see David Balton. "The Compliance Agreement" in
Ellen Hey, ed., Dtvlopments in International Filheries Law IThe Hague: Kluwer, 1999) at 31.
81. Online Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries <http: 'www.fao.org DOCREPi 005/
v9878e00,htm>, 31 October 1995. Respecting the Code, see N. Bonucco, "Towards an International
('ode of Conduct for Responsible Fishing" (1994) 2 R.E.C.I.EL. 245 and Gerald Moore, "The Code
of Conduct for Responsible Fisherie'" in Hey, ibid at 107. On the relationship between the Compli-
ance Agreement, the Code, the Fish Stocks Agreement and the LOS Conivntion, see Rosemary
Rayfuse, "The Interrelationship between the Global Instruments of International Fisheries Law" in
Hey, #bid at 107.
82 Adopted by the 23rd Session of the FAO Committee on Fisheries in February 1999 and en-
dorsed by the FAO Council in November 2000, The text of the IPOA-FC is available at <http://
www.fao org fiiipa/capcacasp>.
83. Adopted by the 24th the Session of the FAO Committee on Fisheries on 2 March 2001 and
cndorscd by the FAO Council on 3 June 2001. The text of the IPOA-IUU is available at <htlp:i/
w% w fao.org/DOCREP/003/X6729e/X6729300.html>.
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noted international instruments and, most certainly, the Fish Stocks
Agreement, regional fishery organizations are not supra-national and thus
are only as effective as their member states want them to be. An example
of this arose in the February 2002 meeting of NAFOx' when the states of
NAFO accepted an increase in the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) of
Greenland halibut despite the recommendation of the Scientific Council,
and over the objections of Canada."-
Another difficulty is that measures adopted by a regional fisheries
organization are binding only on its members and have no direct applica-
tion to non-member states. This issue is one of international treaty law
and international relations and transcends the specifics of fisheries mat-
ters. " Not surprisingly, in seeking to make regional fisheries organiza-
tions more effective a major concern is finding new ways to deal with the
activities of non-parties.
The Fish Stocks Agreement provides that where a competent regional
fisheries organization exists, states should either become members of that
body or they should agree to apply the conservation and management mea-
sures established by such organizations. 7 Only states that are party to the
Fish Stocks Agreement and a regional fisheries organization, or that agree
to apply the relevant conservation and management measures, are to have
access to the fishery resources to which the measures of regional fisheries
organizations apply. " The goal of this provision is to pressure states to
become members of regional fisheries organizations. However, questions
remain over the ability and willingness of existing regional fisheries
organization to accept new members." The Fish Stocks Agreement directs
that regional fisheries organizations are to be open to states having a "real
84. See supra note 66 and accompanying text
85. Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, News Release, "Canada Disappointed with Out-
come of NAFO Meeting" (5 February 2002).
86. Vienna Comention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 8 LL.M. 679 at art. 34, codifies the
well-established rule that a treaty creates neither rights nor obligations for non-parties without their
consent. For a discussion of the application of this rule in the context of the Fish Stocks Agreement,
see Rosemary Rayfuse, "The United Nations Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks as an Objective Regime: A Case of Wishful Thinking?" (2000) 20 Australian Yearbook of
International Law 253 and Erik Franckx. "Pacta Tertiis and the Agreement for the Implementation of
the Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Provisions of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea" (2000) 8 Tul, J. Int'l. & Comp. L. 49.
87. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 10, art. 8(3).
88. ibid. at art. 8(4).
89. The issue of new members is dealt with in the Fsh Stocks Agreement, ibid. at art. 8(3). See
Peter Orebech, Ketill Sigguwjonsson & Ted L. McDorman, supra note 43 at 122-23.
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interest" in the fisheries concerned." As will be noted below, Canada's
involvement in the Convention or the Conservation and Management of
Highly Migratori' Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacifice ' might
be seen as stretching the concept of "real interest."
2. Participation in Regional Fisheries Organizations
Canada participates in a number of regional fisheries organizations with
mandates that include management of straddling, anadromous and highly
migratory stocks. The most important of these, and certainly the one which
has gained most notoriety in Canada, is NAFO.2 Canada also participates
in the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(ICCAT),"3 the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission (NPAFC) 4
and the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO). 95
Canada has a very real interest in the fisheries regulated by these organiza-
tions both as a fishing state and as a coastal state. In each of these fora
Canada has sought to broaden the membership and regulate the fishing
activities of non-members in order to promote better compliance with
organizational measures.
Australia has been a major player in the establishment and work of the
1994 Southern Bhelafin Tuna Convention with New Zealand and Japan.9
The majority of high seas fishing for southern bluefin tuna takes place in
90 One attempt to give meaning to "real interest- in this context is Erik J. Molennaar. "The Con-
cept of 'Real Interest' and Other Aspects of Co-operation through Regional Fisheries Management
Mechanisms" (2000) 15 Int'l J. Mar. & Coast. L. 465.
91 5 September 2000, 40 .LNI 278 (not vet in force). See also online: Western and Central
Pacific Fishcries Cons ention -Prcparatory Conference <http: www.ocean-affairs.com>. IWCP Fish-
eries ('on vention].
42 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
93. The ICCAT was established by the International Convention for the Conseriation ot'Atlannic
Tuna, 14 May 1966. 673 U.N.T.S. 63. See also online: International Commission for the Conserva-
lion of Atlantic Tunas <http:i wwwiccat.es.-.
94 The NPAFC was established by the Conination for the Conseration of Anadromnous Stocks in
the North Pacific Ocean, I I February 1992, reprinted in (1993) 22 United Nations Law of the Sea
Bulletin 21 (entered into force 16 February 1993) [.PFCoroention]. See also online: North Pacific
Anadrnmous Fish Commission <http://www.npafc.org>.
95. The NASCO %as established by the Convention fir the Conseriation olSalmon in the North
Atlantic Ocean. 2 March 1982. T.I.A.S. No. 10789 (entered into force I October 1983). See also
online: North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization <http:!wwvw nasco.int>.
96. The Commission for the Conveution for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, 10 May
1993, A.T.S 1994 No. 16 (entered into force 20 May 1994). See also online: Commission for the
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna <http:/ ww%.ccsbt.org>. The only known spawning area for
southern bluefin tuna is south of Java in the Indian Ocean with juveniles migrating south from the
spawning ground around Australia and New Zealand. A proportion of the stock also moves across
the Indian Ocean towards South Africa. See Anthony Bergin & Marcus Haward, "Southern Bluefin
Tuna Fishcry: Recent Development in International Management" (1994) 18 Marine Policy 263.
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the Indian Ocean. The problem of increasing catches by non-parties
(Taiwan, Korea) has raised concerns about the effective management of
the stock. This problem has been addressed by Australia's efforts to broaden
the membership of the Convention. In 2001 South Korea became a party
to the Convention."' Taiwan was admitted to the "extended Commission"
in early 2002, a move facilitated by the entry into force of the Fish Stocks
Agreement and the application of that Agreement to "fishing entities.""'
Australia is also a member and a key participant in the formation of the
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC). "'' The IOTC's objective is to
promote cooperation among its members to ensure the conservation and
optimum utilization of stocks covered by the FAO Agreement.for the
Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission and to encourage
sustainable development of fisheries based on such stocks. 10' A key issue
of central concern to Australia in Indian Ocean tuna fisheries is the
relationship between IOTC and the Commission for the Conservation of
Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) over southern bluefin tuna. The question
of overlap and competency can be resolved through the provisions of
Article 15 of the IOTC Agreement."' - The IOTC is committed under its
97. See, online: Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna - About the Commis-
sion <http:;,www.ccsbt.org/docs about.html>.
98. Ibid
99. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 10 at art. ](3). Note also Francesco Orrego Viculla, The
Changing International Law of High Sea.s Fisheries (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1999)
at 212-13.
100. The IOTC was established by an agreement adopted by FAO Council in November 1993. It
entered into force with the accession of the tenth member state on 27 March 1996 The IOTC re-
placed and superseded the former Indian Oceans Fisheries Commission. See .4greement.ffir the EN-
tablishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Resolution 1/105, Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation Council 105* Session, Rome 25 Noxember 1993.
101. Conservation and management measures binding members of IOTC must be adopted by two-
thirds majority of members present and voting. Individual members objecting to a measure are not
bound to it. If objections are made by more than one-third of members of the Commission, other
members are not bound by the decision. Recommendations concerning conservation and manage-
ment of stocks need only be adopted by simple majority of members present and voting.
102. Article XV -Cooperation with Other Organizations and Institutions" states:
I. The Commission shall cooperate and make appropriate arrangements therefore with
other intergovernmental organizations and institutions, especially those active in the fish-
cries sector, which might contribute to the work and further the objectives of the Commis-
sion in particular with any intergovernmental organization or institution dealing with tuna
in the Area. The Commission may enter into agreements with such organizations and insti-
tutions. Such agreements shall seek to promote complementarity and, subject to paragraph
2, to avoid duplication in and conflict with the activities of the Commission and such
organizations.
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the rights and responsibilities of other inter-
governmental organizations or institutions dealing with tuna or a species of tuna in the
Area or the validity of any measures adopted by such organization or institution.
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agreement to cooperation and consultation with other management
bodies. The IOTC faces a number of challenges including the problem of
tuna stock assessment, renegotiation of quotas where sequential fishing
takes place of the same species (such as surface fishing for juveniles and
longlining for adults) and the problems of reflagging of vessels.'03
Australia has direct interests in the work of the IOTC and this organization
presents Australia with capacity building opportunities in the Indian Ocean
region.
Even though Canada and Australia are not in geographic proximity,
there is one regional fisheries convention to which both countries are a
party and a second convention which, when it enters into force, may result
in both states being members of the same organization. These two situa-
tions deserve special comment.
Both Canada and Australia are parties to the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources."' The Commission
for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), I'
established by the Convention, has jurisdiction over Antarctic marine
living resources in an area bounded to the north by a line which approxi-
mates the position of the Antarctic convergence and to the south by the
Antarctic continent. "' The Commission is mandated to use an ecosystem
approach to the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources' 07 and it
has pioneered the ecosystem approach now incorporated in many contem-
porary fisheries arrangements. One result of this ecosystem focus has been
that populations of seabirds and their interactions with other species in the
ecosystem have been subject to considerable study.'"6 The realities and
103. Lugten, supra note 79.
104. 20 May 1980, 1329 UN.T.S. 47 (entered into force 7 April 1982).
105. See, online: CCAMLR <http://www.ccamirorg>. Membership in CCAMLR is open to all origi-
nal states parties to the 1980 Convention well as to any state which accedes to the Convention during
such time as that acceding party is engaged in research or harvesting activities in relation to the
marine living resources to which the Convention applies. See Convention on tie Conservation of
,4warrtic Alarine Living Resources, ibid. at art. VII(2)(b). Canada acceded to the Convention with
effect from 31 August 1988 but currently conducts no research or harvesting activities in the Con-
vention Area. There has been some debate over the classification of CCAMLR as a regional fisheries
organization given its broad mandate to manage marine living resources rather than simply fish, It is
clear that notwithstanding these responsibilities (and perhaps because of its pioneering of the eco-
systems approach) CCAMLR fulfils the objectives of a regional fisheries organization as outlined in
the LON Cinvention and the Fish Siock% Agreement.
106. Conention on the Cm.n.ir'atian ol'Antarctic Marine Living Resources, supra note 104 at art, .
107. Ibid at art. 11(3).
10X Andrew J. Constable, et at, -Managing fisheries to conserve the Antarctic marine ecosystem:
practical implementation of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Re-
sources (CCAMLR)" (2000) 57(3) ICES Journal of Marine Science 778.
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politics of single species finfish management ha\ e led to complaints that
the ecosystem approach has not been fully utilized," ' although this
reflects the inherent difficulties of applying "holistic" management
mantras.
Australia is a very actihe participant in the work of C('AMLR. in
particular CCAMLR's efforts to regulate the taking of Patagonian toothfish
by non-CC.'AMLR members. While a party to the Conxcntion, Canada is
not a member of the Commission. Nevertheless. Canada is bound to
respect the conservation and management measures adopted by the
Commission.
The second Convention in which Australia and Canada are both
involved is the I('P Fisheri's Convention. "" The I'CP Fishwrics
Convention is the first regional agreement adopted since the completion of
the Fish Siocks Agreement and. therefore, has been subject to special
examination. Moreover. the it.CP Fisheries Convention addresses the
world's largest stock of highly migratory fish, Pacific tuna." The
Convention establishes the framework for the conservation and manage-
ment of the Pacific tuna fishery in an area where there was previously no
management regime to regulate high seas fishing, although national
management of the stock throughout most regional exclusive economic
zones has been closely coordinated through the Forum Fisheries Agency
(FFA).II-
Australia participated acti elN in the negotiation of the WCP Fisheries
Convnention and strongly supports the entry into force and operationalization
of the Convention, Australias involvement in these negotiations was
influenced by its membership in the Pacific Island Forum, and its support
of Pacific Island states that were anxious to ensure that the Convention
contained strong provisions guiding the work of its Commission. Austra-
109. Such complaints have been made bN non-government organizations N- ithin the Antarctic and
Southern Ocean Coalition and publicized in vanous issues uf ECO, see ifra note 177.
110. Supra note 91.
I 1l1 Ibid. at art. 3 wherein the Convention area is defined by geographical coordinates that include
high seas and exclusive economic zones, but it entails ambiguties concerning territorial seas and
archipelagic waters. See Laurence Cordonnery, "A Note on the 20100 Convention for the Conserva-
tion and Management of Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean" 12(112133 Ocean Devel, &
Int'l L. 8. More generally on the 1VCP Fisheries ConGvntion, see Roseimary Rayfuse, "Develop-
ments in International Environmental Law: The Year in Review Occama" (2Oiit 10YB. Int'l Env
L. 306 and Gregory Rose, "Report on Occania" 20t01) il Y B. int'l Env. L. 551
112. The FFA was created by the South Pacific Forum Fisheries .4g'ny Cmv-ntion, 10 July 1979.
A.T.S. 1979 No. 16 (entered into force 9 August 1979). See online: Forum Fisheries Agency 'http:/
/wws ffa.int>.
68 The Dalhousie Law Journal
lia took this position in opposition to the major distant water fishing
nations, particularly Japan, who wanted the Convention not to be prescrip-
tihe but a 'framework text" allowing the Commission maximum discre-
tion." ' A second, and equally important factor influencing Australia's
position in the negotiation of the WC'P Fisherift'. Convention was its inter-
est in developing its tuna fisheries. The Western Central Pacific stocks
were of increasing interest to Australian fishers, providing opportunities
to expand outside the Australian fishing zone.
Canada, on the other hand, with tenuous ties to the Western and
Central Pacific, first participated in the negotiations as an observer. In
1991). however, as the proposed con% ention area was extended to the north,
Canada sought and %Nas accepted as a full participant. Canada wanted to
bring to the table its experience in other regional fisheries organizations
and in the negotiation of the Fish Stfcks.4grevment. It also wanted to en-
sure the development of a treaty regime that was faithful to the provisions
of the Fish Stocks Agreement and to establish an effcctive regime to pro-
tect Canada's current and future fishing interests in the northern and south-
ern albacore tuna stocks.'
Both Australia and Canada ha~c been active within the regional fisher-
ies organizations to w hich they are members and other international fora.
such as those convened by the FAO. They have sought to have measures
adopted that will lead to the strengthening of the effectiveness of the
management authority of regional fisheries organizations and compliance
%% ith conservation measures.
3. .Adoption of the Precautiona,,' and Ecosysten .4pprmlche.
Within NAFO, Canada has actively supported the adoption of a precau-
tionary approach and has endorsed the 1997 NAFO action plan on
precautionary management,'" the elements of which were originally
proposed by Canada. In 1999 Canada supported within NAFO the adop-
tion of the Resolution to Guide the Implementation of the Precautionary
113, D Doulman, "A Prcliimnary Revicw of Some Aspects of the Process in the Western and Cen-
tral Pacific and South East Atlantic to Implement the Fish Stocks Agreement" (Paper presented to
the (onference -n Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highl MI igratoir Fish Stocks and the
UN Agrcement. \a 1999) [unpublished].
114, scc "satcment by the RepresentatiNc of Canada," Report of the Fifth Session of the Multilat-
eral High Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
in the \\c-,tcrn and Central Pacific, Honolulu. 6- 15 September 1999 [unpublished, on file with authors].
115, NAFO, 1997 NA.IlO Annuul Report at 60.
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Approach"' and has continued to work wvithin the Working Group on the
Precautionary Approach towards the completion of implementation plat
tbr model stocks. The plans w ill then be used as the basis for implementa-
tion of the precautionary approach to all NAFO-regulated fisheries. In 2000
Canada proposed a three-year pilot project (beginning in 2001 ) during which
the work already done on the three model stocks would be operationalized
and more stocks considered for future implementation." ' The proposal
did not succeed, however. and to date progress has been hampered by a
lack of consensus among NAFO member states regarding the fundamental
elements of the precautionary approach." ' Nevertheless, the application
of a broadly defined precautionary approach is evident in the imposition
of moratoria on various stocks. the introduction of lower total allowable
catches, gear restrictions and by catch limitations.' " all of which have been
either initiated, proposed or supported by Canada.
Canada has also promoted precaution and ecosystem considerations in
salmon fisheries management. In 1998 Canadian efforts resulted in the
adoption by NASCO of an Agreement on the Adoption of a Precautionary
Approach' -" to the management of the North Atlantic salmon fisheries. An
Action Plan for the Adoption of the Precautionary Approach, which \was
significantly influenced by Canada's 1999 Atlantic Salmon Management
Plan, was adopted in 1999.i In 2001, the Plan of Action for the Applica-
tion of the Precautionary Approach to Protection and Restoration of
Atlantic Salmon Habitat" w\as adopted. Under the Plan, NASCO
parties will establish comprehensive salmon habitat protection and resto-
ration plans.
While frequently complaining of NAFO decisions that, in Canadas
116. NAFO, 1999 .4FO Annual Report. attachment 2 at 61
1 17. NAFO, "Report of the Fis.herie. Commis ion Annual Meeting'" in 21100 .\ 4FO Annual Report
at 99,
l S' NAFO, "'NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures: Precautionary Approach" (21001
3 .V4F0 .\ewv 3.
119. For example, moratoria were imposed in 2(t10( on the following stocks cdl in divisions 3M
and 3L (that portion within the regulator areal and 3NO, redfish in division 3LN, American plaice
in divisions 3M and 3LN). witch flounder in divisions 3NO and 3L Ithat portion within the regula-
tory areal and capelin in 3NO. See 1999 VIFO Annual Report at 57. These moratoria are still in
place.
120, CNL19814 adopted at the Fifteenth Annual NAS(y) Mcung in June 1998. online: NASCO
<http:;Jwwwnasco.org.uklhtmliagreement-on- adoptionpf.a_prchtml>.
121. CNI 99N48 adopted at the Sixteenth Annual NASC") Miccting in June 199', 1999 Reposrt ol4vw
Annual .tketing of the C in 'il at 145
122. CNL0101 adopted at the Eighteenth Annual NAS(O Nleeting in June 21i, online: NASCO
<http:Iwww.nasco.org.ukthtml.abitat.html>.
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view, defy science, Canada also has made har~esting decisions for species
within Canadian waters that have drawn the ire of NAFO members. For
example, in 1999 and 2000 Canada came under heavy criticism within
NAFO for its decision to conduct an inshore cod fishery. In 1998, Canada
reversed its 1992 moratorium on inshore cod,' - introducing a 4000t total
allowable catch for inshore cod, while maintaining the moratorium on
offshore cod. This was increased to 9000t in 1999. Canada justified its
actions on the basis that the inshore fishery was limited in scope, was
subject to stringent management measures and controls, was necessary for
the acquisition of scientific data. and that the decision to open the fishery
had been taken only after extensive scientific review. 1 1 A total allowable
catch of 7000t was set for 2000 and a reduced total allowable catch of
5600t set for 2001. These moves invoked strong condemnation from the
European Union, in particular, and all NAFO members have expressed
their "serious concern that management measures [for cod stocks in
Division 2J3KL] may not be consistent throughout its range in the
Convention Area in the year 2000) [and 2(1)1 11 -2
Australia has actively supported precautionary approaches in key
regional fisheries organizations. Disagreement on total allowable catch for
the parties to the Southern Bluefin Tuna Con'ention'-' led Australia and
New\ Zealand to seek to use the dispute settlement procedures of the LOS
Conv'ntion against Japan. The key to this dispute was Japan's interest in
maintaining access to the high value southern bluefin tuna to maintain the
profitabilitN of Japanese longliners.'2 _ Differences over the health of the
stock, and therefore the shares of the global quota to be allocated to each
party, together with Japan's unilateral action to establish an experimental
fishing program led to the collapse of access arrangements between
Australia and Japan. In particular, Australia and New Zealand objected to
Japan's experimental fishing program,'" The International Tribunal for
the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) granted provisional measures to Australia and
123, 'e STL1ct. Press' Relcasc ' or Immediate Releae. "Cro'.blc Announces First steps in North-
ern Cod RecoN cry Plan" (2 July 1992) online: <http:;/w ,v.stemnet.nf.ca.cd' announce. htm>.
124 NAF ) "Report of Fisheries Commission Annual Meeting 1999" in 1999 , \FO.4nwa1Report
ai 7x-79
125. NAFO "Report of General Council Annual Meeting 1999 Annex 4. Press Release" 1999 N4FO
'4nnwal Reprl at 57 and "Report of General Council Annual Meeting 1999 Annex 4. Press Release"
2((1 X I'O.)nnaol R'piNrl at 64 and 101-2.
120 ' Se \barcus Haward & Anthony Bergin. "The Political Economy of Japan's Distant Water
luna Fisheries" 12101) 25 Marine Policy 97.
127. Ibid
128 For a detailed discussion, see Barbara Kwiatko\% sk. "The Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand
v Japan: Australia v Japan) .'cs" (20001 15 Int'l J. Mar. & Coast. L. i.
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New Zealand which resulted in an end to Japan's experimental fishing
program for southern bluefin tuna.' - The substance of the legal dispute
was the claim by Australia and New Zealand that Japan "had breached its
obligations under Articles 64 and 116 to 119 of [the LOS Convention] in
relation to the conservation and management of the SBT stock.'' In the
end, the substance of the dispute was not addressed by the Arbitral
Tribunal established pursuant to the dispute settlement procedures of the
LOS Convention, as the Tribunal decided it did not have jurisdiction
respecting the issues."'3 The use of the dispute settlement procedures did,
however, lead the three states to adopt a more positive attitude towards the
issues in dispute. 32
129, International Tribunal for the Law at the Sea: Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (ew Zealand v
Japan; Australia K: Japan) (Provasional Measures), 27 August 1999, 38 I.L.M 1624 (1999).
130. Mark Jennings. "From Montreux to Washington: Australia and the UNCLOS Dispute Settle-
ment Regime" (Paper presented at 9th Annual Conference, Australian and New Zealand Society of
International Law, 13-14 June 20011 [unpublished].
13I, .Arbitral Tribunal Constituted U.nder Anne I 'll of the United .'.ations Contwition on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOSw: Southern Bluefin Tuna Case (Australia and ,es'w Zealand v. Japan) (Award
on Jurisdiction andAdmissibilivj. 4 August 2000.39 IL.M 1359 12000). online: Southern Bluefin
Tuna Arbitration (New Zealand %. Japan: Australia v. Japan) <http:. wwwoceanlaw.net/cases/
tuna2ahtn>.
132. See Bill Mansfield. "Southern Bluefin Tuna - Comments" (Paper presented to the SEAPOL
Inter-Regional Conference on Ocean Goermance and Sustainable Development in East and South-
eastAsian Seas: Challenges in the New Millennium, 21-23 March 2001 ). online: <www.mft.govt.nz/
supportilegallseapol.html>. Mansfield comments:
[A] year and three quarters after the legal proceedings were filed the atmosphere in [South-
ern Bluefin Tuna] Commission meetings is constructive, considerable progress has been
made on a number of important issues, the most important non party fishing state has given
formal notice of its intention to become party to the Convention and a mechanism mvolv-
ing independent external scientists has been agreed for the development of a scientific
programme that will help to resolve the uncertainties about the future prospects for the
stock.
Few of those who have been involved would have any doubt that the legal proceedings
have played a major role in this turn around and yet the only formal outcome of those
proceedings is a decision by the Arbitral Tribunal that it did not have jurisdiction to hear
the merits of the case.
(A]II three of the parties have in fact heard and responded to the message from the Tnbu-
nal, Following the Award by the Tribunal, Japan advised Australia and New Zealand that
it wished to see a return to consensus and cooperation in the Commission. It proposed high
level negotiations for that purpose and indicated that it did not intend to conduct a further
unilateral EFP. The subsequent negotiations were held in a positive and constructive atmo-
sphere and considerable further progress was made. In particular it was agreed that the
way to resolve the disagreement about the appropriate nature and extent of experimental
fishing was to engage independent external scientists to devise a scientific programme
which would best contribute to reducing the uncertainties in relation to the stock.
Regarding the continuing work of the Southern Bluefin Tuna Commission, see supra note 96.
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Australia has committed considerable resources in developing the
ecosystem management approach within the Commission for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) making
significant scientific contributions into putting the approach into opera-
tion." ' Additionally, Australia has taken the lead in negotiations with New
Zealand and South Africa for the development of regional management
arrangements for demersal stocks in the southwest Indian Ocean. These
discussions. and preparation of draft arrangements, are ongoing.'
4. En/orcentei at Sea
The strong commitment of Australia and Canada to ensuring direct at sea
enforcement of consc\ ation and management measures adopted by
regional fisheries organizations and to deter illegal, unregulated, and
unreported fishing activities is notorious. In Canada's case, the 1995
.,se/ure on the high seas of the Spanish trawler Estai has attained a mythi-
cal status as an assertion of the importance Canada places on at sea
enforcement. An important factor in Australia's decision to ratify the Fish
Stocks .4grvenzent N\as the increasing problems of illicit fishing within
Australia's 200-mile EEZ associated with straddling stocks in the Tasman
Sea and adjacent to Heard and McDonald Islands.
In 1991 Australia and New Zealand entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) concerning the need to manage the straddling
orange roughy stock in the Tasman Sea. "' - This understanding, initiated
by Ne\ Zealand, included an agreement to exchange information,
conduct research about the stock and cooperate in management. 3 6 The
1991 M()U governing fishing on the South Tasman Rise ended in Febru-
ary 1999 and the two states could not reach a further accord,' but the
133. See. e g A J ('nstable, "The l:,:osysteni Approach to managing Fisheries: Achieving Conser-
vation ()bictive. for Predators oftishvd Specie,," (2001 NC(C \\ILR Science 37.
134 Auntralian iaritime t :t.w, No N3, I August 20011
135, See Enk J Molenaar, "The South Tasman Rise Arrangement of 211H) and Other Initiatives on
\iinaigcimcni and Conservation of Orange Roughy" 2001) I1ti i) Int'l . Mar. & Coast. L. 77.
136 1 he South 'a,,man Rise Mti I of 1991 included Netting a precautionary T.AC of 2.100 tonnes
for each 12 month period; the division of the FA( between Australia (40 per cent) and New Zealand
121 per cent), and establishing a program of research between 'SIRO, IRS and the New Zealand
National Institutc oh" \Vater and Atmosphere i N I\ i .This program %%a., conducted between July and
August 1998* .
137. The collapse of the M )U indicatcs the fragility of such arrangements in dealing v. ith interna-
tional fishery allocation issues. rather than indicating an inherent iveakness with cooperative, less
formal, apprAtches to shared stock management once allocation issues ha,.e been agreed.
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MOU was revived in a different form in 2000.1 The arrival of fishing
vessels registered in South Africa and Belize in the waters above the South
Tasman Rise in mid-1999 resulted in Australia initiating discussions with
the flag states of these vessels over control of fishing effort."' As a result,
Belize de-registered the vessel under its flag, which subsequently moved
away from the South Tasman Rise1 "0 Decisions with South Africa were
less successful, but they did set the groundwork for future cooperative
enforcement."'i
The establishment of Australia's Southern Ocean fishery off Heard and
McDonald Islands moved the focus of Australian fishing activity from
that of a coastal fishery to one with a distant water capability. It has also
resulted in aggressive enforcement of Australia's fishing laws in the 200-
mile zone areas around these islands. The Royal Australian Navy arrested
two vessels for illegal fishing within Australian waters on 21 October 1997
and a third vessel on 21 February 1998. 142 More recently, two Russian-
flagged vessels (the Lena and Iblga) were apprehended by a Royal
Australian Navy frigate within Australian waters on 6 and 7 February
2002.' 43 Australia has moved to establish a cooperative surveillance
arrangement with France in the Southern Ocean, particularly around Heard
and McDonald Islands."" The proposed arrangement involves a "cross-
vesting" of powers between Australian and French vessels patrolling the
national waters that bounds the French Island of Kerguelen and Heard and
McDonald Islands. The agreement will result in increased surveillance of
the Kerguelen Plateau area, a prime target area for foreign fishers seeking
138. Hon Warren Truss MP: Minister for Agrculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Media Release,
AFFAOO/ I 2WT, "Orange Roughy Agreement" 17 February 2000). online: Hon Warren Truss MP
<http:uiwww.affa go-.au:801ministers tru. v releass 0O1/Oi2wt html>. This agreement has resulted in
a reduction in the TAC from 2,400 to 1,800 tonnes for the 2002-03 season, see Australian .taritime
Digest, No. 105, 1 August 2002.
139. These incidents were given wide publicity on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Televi-
sion documentary "Sea of Trouble" screened on Four Comers on 30 August 1999.
140. Australian Maritime Digest, No. 73. 1 September 1999.
141. This involved support from South Africa in the arrest of the Togo-registered South Tomi, con-
cluding a 4,100 km hot pursuit by an Australian fisheries surveillance vessel. See Australian Mari-
time Digest, No. 91, I May 2001.
142. Australian Maritime Digest, No. 57, i April 1998.
143. Federal Minister for Forestry and Conservation, Senator Ian Macdonald & Minister for De-
fence, Senator Robert Hill, Joint Statement, AFFA02i I MJ, "Suspected Illegal Fishing Vessels Ar-
rive in Fremantle" (19 February 2002).
144. Senator The Hon. Ian Macdonald: Minister for Fisheries, Forestry and Conservation, Media
Release, AFFAO2/Doorstop Interview, "Arrival of suspected illegal fishing vessels into Fremantle"
(19 February 2002), online: Senator The Hon. Ian Macdonald: Minister for Fisheries, Forestry and
Conservation <http://www.affa.gov.au/ministers/macdonald/releases/2002/ aftnadoorstop.html>.
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Patagonian toothfish. The arrangement, however, has yet to be concluded.
Article 20 of the Fish Stockv, Agreinment sets out the framework for
cooperation in enforcement of conservation and management measures to
be adopted by regional fisheries organizations. States are to assist each
other in identifying vessels reported to have engaged in activities that
undermine the effectiveness of regional fisheries organization conserva-
tion and management measures and, to the extent permitted by their
national laws, states are to establish arrangements for making evidence
relating to violations available to prosecuting authorities in other states. It
is, however, Article 21 which is the -meat" of the enforcement provisions
of the Fish Stick.',grecnient. Article 21 provides for cooperation between
flag and inspecting states over investigation and prosecution of violations
of conser\ ation and management measures. It also provides for boarding,
inspection and follow-up action in respect of stateless vessels and vessels
the flag state of which has failed to cooperate. Article 21 also establishes a
limited exception to the exclusivit% of flag state enforcement jurisdiction.
Member states of regional fisheries organizations may board and inspect
vess ls of non-members that are within the relevant regulatory area to
ensure compliance with that organization's conservation and management
measures, provided both states concerned are States Party to the Fish Stocks
Ag'reinent. In addition, where there are clear grounds for believing a
\iolation of an organization's measures has occurred, non-flag coastal state
members may board and inspect such vessels if they enter an area under
their national jurisdiction during the same fishing trip. States are to estab-
lish, through regional fisheries organizations, boarding and inspection
procedures that are, at a minimum, consistent with those in Article 22 of
the Fish Stocks .4greement which sets out the basic procedures to be
follo\ ed in boarding and inspection.
At the practical level, Canada has taken a leading role in promoting
enforcement in the NAFO regulatory area by pro% iding extensive air and
sea surveillance under the Scheme of Joint International Inspection and
Surveillance. 45 Additionally, considerations of the legality of the arrest of
the Estai aside, the ensuing settlement reached in the Canada - European
Community .-greeed Minute on the Conservation and .1anagentent of Fish
45 c "Canadian Inspection and Surveillance Activ ities in the NAFO Regulatory Area" (1994) 1
\.4FO \cw 6. The Scheme, elaboraled in the NAFO Conservation and Enforcement measures,
enables NAFO contracting parties, pursuant to Articles I I and 23 of the X4FO Con nion, to con-
duct ; i-sea inspection of contracting Party esscels, to make courtesy boardings of non-contracting
parties' vessel.% and carry out air surveillance of fishing activities in the NAFO Regulatory Area.
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Stocks'4 has resulted in considerable strengthening of NAFO's enforce-
ment mandate both in respect of contracting and non-contracting parties.
In 1995 NAFO adopted a protocol, as called for in the Estai settlement,
which included considerable improvements to conservation and enforce-
ment measures. " These included improvements to inspection procedures
and dispositions of apparent infringements, a modification of the hail
system bN incorporation of catch reports and other practical features, a
minimum size for (ireenland halibut of 30 cm and fishing plans for vessels
fishing Greenland halibut and shrimp in the regulatory area. Most impor-
tantly, from Canada's perspective. the 1995 Protocol called for the
implementation of a Pilot Observer Project for 100" b observer coverage of
all vessels fishing in the regulatory area, satellite tracking devices on 35"o
of all vessels during the period 1996-97. increased inspections and require-
ments for prompt reporting and follow up on infractions. This Pilot Project
was made permanent in 199,4 with the adoption of the Program for
Observers and Satellite Tracking which now requires permanent 100%
observer coverage on all contracting party vessels fishing in the NAFO
area and satellite vessel monitoring systems (VMS) on all vessels fishing
in the NAFO area as from I Januarv 2001 .L" The success of the observer
scheme \ as acknowledged by \AFO in 1998 N% hen it noted that apparent
infringements of its rules had declined by o er 801,o since the observer
scheme was implemented.
49
Measures hav e also been adopted by NAFO aimed at deterring non-
contracting party *essels from fishing in the regulatory area. A Scheme to
Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels aimed at provid-
ing information and follow-up on sightings of non-contracting party
vessels and at preventing transshipments to or from non-contracting party
vessels was adopted in 1997'-" and amended by the addition of further
146. 20 April Ilt*5. 34 L.L.M 1260 IW5 i. For a discu,,ion of the settlement, see Christopher C.
Joyner, "On the Borderline? Canadian Activism in the Grand Banks" in Olav Schram Stokke, ed-,
Governing High Stca% F.herre.%. The Initrlday of Global and Regional Rrginex (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 20101 207
147 NAFO, "NAFO Accord on Ne Conservation and Enforcement Measures" (19953 3 NAFO
News 3 and see "Report of General Council Annual Meeting 1 995 Annex 4, Press Release" 1995
NAFOAnnual Report at 34 and 514-72.
14. See NAFO, "NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures" (199819 NAFO New", 4
149, Canada Department of Fisheries of Oceans. Ncw, Release, NR-llQ-9H-48E, "NAFO Confirms
100 per cent Observer Program" ( 18 September 198).
150. NAFO, "Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vcsscls with the Conser-
vation and Enforcement Measures Established by NAFO" adopted at the 19th Annual Meeting of the
NAFO General Council. September 1997, NAFOiGC Doc. 97,6.
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provisions prohibiting transshipments in 199 . " ' The success of the scheme
can be inferred from the reduction of sightings of non-contracting party
vessels in the NAF0 area from four in 1998,. 2 to two in 1999,'" to zero in
2(0((),1 4
Despite these successes, hoNexer, (anadian monitoring of foreign
activity within the NAFO area has continued to reveal violations of NAFO
Conservation Measures by vessels of NAFO member states. Canada has
continued to push within NAFO for the adoption of more stringent
measures to address non-compliance. In February 2002. in response to
Canada', disclosure of non-compliance by some members, NAFO agreed
to establish a process to review and assess compliance performance on an
annual basis.' '
In March 2002 Canada closed its ports to vessels from the Faroe
Islands"' and in April 2(002 it closed its ports to % essels from Estonia,"' in
response to oN er-quota and other non-compliant fishing activities in 2001
and 2002. Also in March 2002. Canadian officials conducted a routine
port inspection of the Russian Nessel the Olga when it called into Long
Pond, Newfoundland to effect repairs. Large quantities of fish were
discovered on board that allegedly had been taken in the NAFO regulatory
area in contravention of NAF() conser\ation measures. Canada has
reported the infractions to the Russian authorities who have indicated their
intention to cancel the \essel's license to fish in the NAFO area for the
remainder of the year and to take other action against the vessel.'"5
At sea enforcement has also been a key consideration within the North
Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission (NPAFC). The North Pacific
And-moaous Fish Convention'59 (.P4F Convention) prohibits all salmon
fishing in the northern Pacific Ocean and its adjacent seas beyond the 200-
mile zones of its member states. Canada, the United States, Russia and
151 N \FO, "-I 0 Conscration and Enforcement \Mcaiures No Transshipment of Fish from
\on-Contracting Party Vesels" I I'A) 9 NAFO News 5
152 NAF. 'MAilor Ideas and Discussions at the General Counci" J(1Q8) 9 NAFO News 3,
153, NAM , "Diusions at the General Council: Non-Contracting Party Fishing Acti- ities" (1999)
II N\ 0News 4.
154 NXFO, "(eneral Council Dciioins'" (2(HH 13 NA %F) N 2
155 Canada Department oFfishcrisc and Occans.. Nc s Release, NR-IQ-1)2-(Sh:, 'Canada disap-
iinted with ()utcome ofNAF) Mccting" 5 February 2002)
156, "Canada (Chscs P iws to 1-ishmg 'essels from the Faroe Wands" Canadian ' si 1f1re (21
\arch 202)
157, "Canada ('loses Ports to Fishing "cswk from Estonia" Canadian XVNwx IIf #v (9 April 2002).
15S "'\hmiicr Thibault Pleased with Russia', Cooperation Regarding Fishing Ve+sel OLGA" Ca-
nadian ,tWire'. Ir'' 0 April 21102)
151) ,VINF Ca'ntivauw, vu pra note 94.
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Japan.' " Canada participates actively in efforts to prevent directed fishing
in the Convention area for anadromous fish or the retention of incidental
anadromous by-catch, through the provision of aircraft for surveillance
duties aimed at detecting the presence of illegal high seas driftnet fishing
activity in the Convention area."' In recent years these patrols have formed
part of a broader coordinated enforcement program which includes air
surveillance patrols mounted by Canada and the US Coast Guard, and
surface patrols by vessels from the US Coast Guard, the Russian Border
Guard Service and the Japanese Maritime Agency. For example, in 1998
Canada conducted four aerial surveillance patrols utilizing Department of
National Defence CP 140 Aurora aircraft.Y-" In 1999, Canada conducted
144 hours of air surveillance involving the use of two Aurora aircraft, 53
Canadian Armed Forces staff, two fishery officers from Fisheries and
Oceans Canada and two United States National Marine Fisheries Service
agents.' During 2000 Canada conducted 169 aircraft patrol hours over
the North Pacific with similar personnel levels and with the addition of a
Canadian Forces operation control team that was co-located with the United
States Coast Guard in Juneau, Alaska, through the period of deployment.'
An increased number of patrol hours (216) were flown in 200 L."'
These coordinated enforcement activities appear to have been success-
ful in reducing the occurrence of salmon driftnetting activities on the high
seas in the NPAF Comnention area. While generally more sightings than
apprehensions have occurred, apprehensions of vessels conducting
"illegal fishing activities" in the \P4F Convention area (including vessels
from Russia, China, Taiwan and Honduras) appear to have resulted in their
virtual elimination from the area. In 1997, one of six vessels sighted was
apprehended.'" In 1998 seven vessels were detected conducting "illegal
fishing operations" and only two apprehended.""6 In 1999, three of ten
160, Ibid. at art, Ill
161. This action is also taken pursuant to the moratorium on high seas driftnet fishing established
pursuant to Large-scale pelagic driftnet flshing and its impact an the living marine resources of the
wo jds oceans and seai. GA Res. 44 225, UN GAOR, 44th Sess., UN Doc. AIRES:44 225 (1989),
reaffirmed in GA Res. 45,197, UN GAOR, 45th Sess., UN Doc. AIRES 451197 (1990) (same title)
and GA Res. 46/215, UN GAOR, 46th Sess., UN Doc. A/RES.46.215 (l991) (same title) which
called upon the international community to implement the rc,.olutions on the moratorium. See Johnston,
supra note 6 and Burke, Freeberg & Miles, supr note 6.
162. "Consideration of Enforcement" I 998 NPAFCAnnual Report 23.
163. "ENFO Highlights" (WinteriSpring 2000) 4(1) Newsletter of the North Pacific Anadromous
Fish Commission 3 [NPAFC Newsletter).
164. NPAFC "Consideration of Enforcement" 2000 NPAFC Annual Report 34.
165. NPAFC "Consideration of Enforcement" 2001 NPAFCAnnual Report 38.
166. NPAFC " Consideration of Enforcement" 1997 NPA FCAnnual Report 2 1.
167. NPAFC "Consideration of Enforcement" 1998 NPAFC Annual Report 23,
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vessels sighted were apprehended' and in 2000 one vessel was appre-
hended"" No vessels were sighted "fishing illegally" within the Conven-
tion area in 2001, although one was sighted fishing illegally within the
Russian 200-mile zone. That vessel was apprehended by the Russian
authorities. '"
5, Trade-Relwted Measutvs
Australia has supported the development of trade-related enforcement
measures in the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Living Resources (CCAMLR) and the Commission for the Conservation
of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT). The Australian delegation urged that
CCAM LR, at its 1997 meeting, adopt measures (including trade documen-
tation) to curb the high levels of illicit fishing."' In 1998 Australia and the
United States submitted draft conservation measures to establish a catch
documentation system (CDS) for Patagonian toothfish. While these
proposals did not gain the necessary consensus at the time, the meetings
did recognize the need to continue to develop a certification scheme that
would be compliant with international trade rules as set out in the World
Trade Organization."- In November 1999, a catch documentation system
\\as adopted by CCAMILR. 7 The scheme establishes a framework for
tracking landings and trade flows of toothfish from the CCAMLR Conven-
tion area. It requires CCAMLR members to ensure that their vessels
IhS \P\F( "'Spring 1999 Coopcrative High scas Enforcement"fSummer 1999) 32)NP4FC \eits-
ei'tter 2.
I 64 NP,\ FC "'( tnidcralion of lnforcement" 2000 VP4FC Innual Report 35-37
1741 \PAI('Clth Annual \leting. News Release i2N October - 2 Noxember 2001) online: NPAFC
'ith Annual Meeting <http:' wwwnpafc.org,'events;New sRelea.,c NesRelcasc 2001.htm>. See also
-Entforcement Evaluation and Coordination Meeting" 12m1011 512).\P4FC ewsl tter I
171. CommiNsion fir the Conwcrxation of Antarctic \l1,rmne Lix ing Resources, Report of the Six-
teenth Meectin f ethv Scwntilh ('ont itile iHohjrt, Austraha 27-31 00oher 1997), online: Com-
mision Reports Directory i(.'(AM LR XVI) -http/w ,iwccamlr.org puie pubs.crdnrt.htm> at para 5.3 1,
172 Key World Trade (Organiation IWTO) principles appear to be non-discrimination and trans-
parency which arc intended to ensure that measures introduced are not disguised bamers to trade.
Other consideration might include whether the measure is based on an internationally or regionally
rccuigni/cd standards dcx eloped through consultation % ith stakcholders and whether a multilateral
agreement or tther international instrument rcognircs the environmental benefits of taking the
measure being enforced through trade measures. See Salh Bache, Marcus Haward & Stephen Dovers,
The Impact l Efsiomic , Envirvnrmental, and Trade Instruments upon Fish'riex Poh¢wv and Alan-
agemt'nt (Wollongong: ('entrc Itir Maritime Policy. 2001) at 73-76. See also David R. Downes &
Brennan Van Dyke, Fish'rk, ("fnworvafion and Trade Rules. Ensuring that Trade Law Promotes
,ut awt/' ic i hv w 1\Va%',hington, .(C.: ('enter for International Environmental Law and
(ircenpeac.c, 199M).
173. Conservation Measure 171V X VIII which, in accordance N ith Commission rules, entered into
force in \1.i 2M(N). x\ months after the conclusion of the Commission meeting.
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complete documentation for landing and transshipment and requires the
form to be forwarded to the C'CANILR Secretariat and entered into a data-
base. 4 The purpose of the scheme is to monitor the international trade in
toothfish; to identify the origins of toothfish imported into or exported
from the territories of CCAMLR contracting parties; to determine whether
toothfish caught in the Con% ention area were caught in a manner consis-
tent with CCAMLR conservation measures: and to gather scientific data
for the scientific evaluation of stcks. To this end, all landings, transship-
ments and importation of toothfish into the territories of CCAMLR
contracting parties are to be accompanied by a completed catch document
which includes information relating to the volume and location of catch
and the name and flag state of the .essel..' The scheme came into force in
May 2000.
Despite being a contracting party to the CC4A.LR Convention, one of
the largest consumer markets for toothfish, and a re-exporter of toothfish
products to the United States.' Canada has not yet implemented the catch
documentation scheme. Canada has been accused of being a popular country
for -laundering" illicitl% harvested toothfish. '7
Canada, hoxveN er. has not been an enthusiastic supporter of trade-
related measures. Canada has commented that:
174. The specific elements of the CC AMLR CDS are that: CCAMLR parties will require that each
of their vessels complete a Dissostichus catch document with appropriate endorsement, require that
any toothfish landed at its ports or transshipped to its %essels be accompanied by a completed and
certified Diss ,stichus catch document; and that each shipment of ioothfish into its territory be ac-
companied by the DiNostichus catch document or documents, certified by the exporting state, that
account for all of that shipment.
175. Commission for the Consers ation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. Report of the Eigh-
teenth .lketing uf'the Csominivmn tHobart. Australia. 25 October - 5 \Vowaber 1999), online:
Commission Reports Directory IC(A\ILR XVIII) <http: wwsw.ccamlrorg puic /pubs .cr'drt.htm>
at Annex 7: Explanatory Mcmiorandum on the Introduction of the Catch Documentation Scheme for
Toothfish (Dissostichus Spp. i.
176. Canada ranks third behind Japan and the United States in toothfish imports. Canadian imports
of toothfish ifresh and frozenl in 1999 totaled 709 tons. In 2(i(i1 Canada imported 1143 tons of
toothfish from predominantly Ci AMLR member states Notably. however, 39 tons were imported
from Mauritius, a country long associated with IUU toothfish trade. ScV M Lack & G. Sant
"Patagonian Toothfish: Are Conservation and Trade Measures Working?" (2001l |19(11 TRAFFIC
Bulletin i.
177. "Canada Disgraces Itself" ECO I. CCAMLR XX 22 October 2001, Hobart, Tasmania 3-4
ECO is published by the Friends of the Earth and other non-government organi/ations at interna-
tional environmental meetings. This volume was a joint project of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean
Coalition, Friends of the Earth International, World Wide Fund for Nature International and the
Antarctica Project, online: Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition <http://www.asoc.orgscurrentpress
/XXCCAMLRECOI .htm>
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[CJanada recognizes the right of states, consistent with the Marrakech
Agreement establishing the WTO, to adopt or enforce measures relating
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. Canada does not, at
this time, endorse as an automatic policy, an undertaking to apply sanctions
with respect to trade in fish and fish products in cases of IUU fishing with
respect to all regional fisheries management organizations, Rather, states
should decide on the use of trade measures on a case-by-case basis, having
due regard to the specific circumstances.
Meanwhile, Australia has been active in establishing a trade information
scheme within the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin
Tuna (CCSBT). This scheme was introduced in 2000' and is modeled on
a similar scheme utilized since 1993 within ICCAT.111 The Southern Blue-
fin Statistical Document Program is built on the premise that "there is no
waiver" of the requirement that importation of southern bluefin tuna into
the territory of a member of the CCSBT is to be accompanied by a CCSBT
Southern Bluefin Statistical Document.
Conclusion
Australia and Canada, independently, and on occasion cooperatively, have
evinced an unequivocal commitment to the adoption and implementation
of the 1995 Fish Stocks .4greement through the political decision to ratify
the agreement, the legal implementation of the agreement into domestic
law and diplomatic efforts within various regional fisheries organizations
and fisheries negotiations to secure the adoption of the principles espoused
178. Intervention made by Delegation of Canada on adoption of the FAO International Plan of Ac-
tion to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, note 84, repro-
duced in Report of the 24' Session of the Committee on Fisheries. Rome 26 February - 2 March
2001, submitted to the 120' Sesion of the FAO Council, FAO Doc CL 1207 at paras. 105-106,
online: FAO <http:!/www.fao.org/docrep/mectig/003/yO220eyO220e0. httn>.
179, The Trade Information Scheme was adopted in 1999 and was implemented with effect from I
June 2000. See CCSBT, Report of the Sixth Annual .1M'ting Firt Part (29-30 November 1999)
online Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna - Meeting Reports <http:/1
www.ccsbt.orgtdocs/meting-r.html> at para. 18,
180. The Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program (BTSD Program) was established by ICCAT
in 1992 to monitor trade in Atlantic bluefin tuna. It was extended to swordfish, bigeye tuna and other
species managed by ICCAT in 2000. See ICCAT Recommendation 92-1, ICCAT Bluefin Tuna Sta-
tistical Document Program (BTSD) Frozen Bluefin Tuna Products; ICCAT Recommendation 93-3,
ICCAT Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Program (BTSD) Fresh Products; and ICCAT Recom-
mendation 00-02, Recommendation by ICCAT on Establishing Statistical Document Program for
Swordfish, Bigeye Tuna and Other Species Managed by ICCAT. Respecting the work of ICCAT, see
note 94.
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in the 19i)5 agreement. The record of Australia and Canada on these
matters has been set out at length in this contribution and need not be
restated.
The Australian and Canadian governments are not complacent respect-
ing what has been achie% ed in implementing the Fish Stocks Agreement
and in the attainment of the goals of sustainable conservation and manage-
ment of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. There are, however,
legal, political-diplomatic challenges ahead for Australia and Canada in
seeking effective implementation of the Fish Stocks Agreinmnt and the
principles therein.
One challenge lies in increasing the number of states that are either a
party to the Fish Stocks Agreement or adhere to the principles of the agree-
ment. Four major distant water fishing states are not vet a party to the 1995
agreement: the European Community. Japan, South Korea and the People's
Republic of China. ' The situation of Taiwvan is, of course, complicated. '"
For Australia, ke. neighbors such as New Zealand, Papua New Guinea
and six other South Pacific states are parties to the agreement. For Canada,
both the United States and the Russian Federation are state parties. This
adherence by neighbors makes the strong coastal state postures of Austra-
lia and Canada on high seas fishing issues politically and practically easier
to sustain. It is tempting to assert that the principles emboded in the Fish
Stocks Agreement are or will soon become part of customary international
law and, therefore, state party status is unimportant. For a number of
reasons such an assertion is premature. Much of the agreement is directed
at regional fisheries organizations and one must look to the work of the
organization to determine their customary legal status. This has not yet
been done comprehensively.-
This raises the more important legal, political-diplomatic challenge of
having regional fisheries organizations adopt the principles and rules
contained in the Fish Stocks. Agreement. Altering the mindset, capacities,
procedures and rules of pre-existing regional fisheries organizations to have
them implement or at least take into account the contents of the Fish Stocks
Agreement is an ongoing diplomatic process even without certain member
18 1. Current information on the state parties to the Fivh Stock.igrcement may be found at DAOI.0s,
supra note 1.
182. Taiwan cannot be a party to the Fish Siotkv igis't'ment, .o through the concept of a "fishing
entity" Taiwan can apply the Agreement and obtain benefits under the Agreement, supra note 99.
See also Cordonnery, supra note I I I at 5-6
183. For a preliminary (and concurnng) assessment of the value of state practice in the South East
Atlantic, the Western Central Pacific and the South Tasman Rise, see Rayfusc. supra note 81,
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states' opposition. The difficulty is empitomized by the work of the
negotiators of the U( "P hishories C onvention. They had a clean slate upon
which to work and a new Fish S .gr enwnt with which to work but
they failed, in certain important respects, to make the Convention com-
pletely true to the Fish Stocks .4greement. '
It is a truism that regional fisheries organizations are political bodies.
Niember states are accountable to their populations for the actions they
take both in negotiating the conventions and in the creation of manage-
ment measures. This is especiall% the case in democratic states such as
Australia and Canada, whose politicians and governments are accountable
in an open manner to the public. For international organizations to be
effective all state parties must feel the political benefits outweigh the
political costs and must be able to communicate this to their national
publics. The challenge for Australia and Canada in this environment is to
seek to achiee acceptable compromises within regional fisheries organi-
zations and to move as, far forward as possible towards the implementation
of the Fish Sto, ks Agreement.
Another important challenge is to recruit more members for regional
fisheries organizations. Both Australia and Canada have this as a funda-
mental policy at present and have had some success at expanding the
membership of certain regional fisheries organizations. Membership must
accord with benefits otherwise unattainable. The challenge is, on the one
hand to proN ide new members with a benefit, but, on the other hand, not to
force existing members to yield some of their benefits so as to undermine
the existing members' support for the organization. The Fix/h StocksAgree-
ment tries to address this very problem.' It is important to note that new
members mav alter existing understandings and work habits and lead to
organizational changes in unanticipated Nva\ s. This is the potential danger
of introducing new parties into regional fisheries organizations.
Being a member state to a regional fisheries organization is only one
step along the way to implementation of the goals of the Fish Stocks Agree-
ment. Fishers from member states engage in harvesting that is illegal and
unreported. Thus, within regional fisheries organizations there is the
challenge of adopting enhanced compliance and enforcement mechanisms
respecting the management measures adopted. The experiences in NAFO1'1
184 Ncc generally otordonnery and Rose. supra note I I 
185. Fish Sik A.grewcnt. .uprm note 10 at art. 83. 'ee ako text accompanying notes 94-97.
186. Sce "Enforcement at Sea" abo\ c, for more.
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and CCAMLR'' described above need to be evaluated and, if workable,
perhaps adopted by other regional fisheries organizations.
Another legal, political-diplomatic challenge is the relationship of
members of regional fisheries organi/ations and non-members of the
organization. Regional fisheries organizations are contractual in nature.
The rules and decisions of each organization are not applicable to non-
members. Thus Australia and Canada have attempted to increase the
membership of such organizations. States, including Canada, have evinced
a reluctance to embrace sweeping changes in the fundamental tenets of
public international law that may undermine a consent-based approach to
treaties. The phrase *'international ocean governance" is sometimes used
in a way that suggests that if a majority of states agree to a regional fisher-
ies organization that dissenters must also agree. Politically and diplomati-
cally this is clever rhetoric, but legally it is nonsense. The challenge for
Australia and Canada is not to find \ ays to undermine consent as the basis
of international law, but to continue to utilize political and diplomatic
approaches to the issue of non-members.
The reality of the relationship of members of regional fisheries organi-
zations and non-members is that the fishing activities of non-members in
areas otherwise under the authorit. of a regional fisheries organization,
colorfully referred to as "piracy." is simply unregulated. Illegal and
unreported fishing activities of members of regional fisheries organiza-
tions has been and will continue to be a priority and a challenge for Austra-
lia and Canada within regional fisheries organizations and the FAO.
Finally, as if all the legal. political and diplomatic challenges described
above are not enough, it will be incumbent on states to develop workable
(which also means politically acceptable) fisheries regimes based on
scientific and managerial protocols that are true to the various concepts,
such as precaution, ecosystem management and compatibility that are
referred to in the Fish Stock.\ Agreenient while attaining the goal of
sustainability.
187. See "Trade-Related Measures" above, for more,

